14 Assessment of Australian Military, Operations
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This article is from the Vietnam FAQ, by Brian Ross, John R. Tegtmeier, Edwin E. Moise, Frank Vaughan, John Tegtmeier with numerous contributions by others.
14 Assessment of Australian Military, Operations
AATTV: Quite obviously if the general method of operations
practiced by Australian forces was significantly different to those
employed by US forces, then so to would the training techniques. The
AATTV, in instructing Vietnamese officers, often found themselves
contradicting or being contradicted by US advisers. In addition to
this, such was the social status acquired by being an officer in ARVN
that Junior officers were discouraged from humiliating their seniors
by learning more than they. Particularly if one trained junior officer
was expected to serve under an untrained (by AATTV or others) senior
officer.(37) AATTV advisers serving with Montegnard units found that
ethnic rivalry between Montegnards and the Vietnamese often resulted
in 'no shoot' a greements being made with the NLF and VC forces
entering Vietnam via Laos or Cambodia. Peterson's Montegnard Special
Forces at one stage in 1964 even rebelled, marching on ARVN forces in
Ban Me Thout.(38)
AATTV operations under COMMACV were quite successful. There were
few problems in the actual command system, save that their were
disagreements over methodology when it came to instruction. AATTV's
only real problems came from working with the ARVN forces , whom they
frequently found to be unenthusiastic, lazy and often corrupt.
1 RAR and US 173rd Abn Bde: There were again general differences
of opinion between these two units as to the conduct of operations.
The Airborne Brigade was designed for large deployments and heavy
firepower whereas 1 RAR, even though restructured to suit the American
style, with its COIN experience in Malaya operating individually from
larger units was unfamiliar and uncomfortable with these type of
tactics.(39) One such example of this was 1 RAR's training with
helicopters. In Malaya, up to 4 helicopters, primarily for medevac
purposes, was all a company could expect or need. There was no
requirement for the calling of air strikes and little for artillery
strikes. Yet at Bien Hoa, the latter of these two were frequently
practiced, due to the number of enemy being engaged, and up to 40
helicopters were effectively at the disposal of the battalion.(40)
Unlike subsequent Australian forces, there was little association with
ARVN forces and no reliance on them.
Australian Task Force: 1ATF met with mixed successes during its
five years in Phuoc Tuy. Initially, 5 & 6 RAR encountered large scale
opposition and attempted to combat NLF political structure. Given the
limitations under which 1 ATF worked (poor equipment, ambiguous
objectives and unfamiliar combat environment), it could be asserted
that it was quite successful in doing this.(41) Long Tan and the
subsequent follow up missions severely damaged NLF main force units in
the region, however, it is was apparent that the relative speed with
which the NLF reasserted itself in the years of ATF's withdrawal
indicates the failure to win the hearts and minds of the people, a
tactic essential to the defeat of communist terrorists in Malaya and
Borneo.
The increase in size of 1 ATF in November 1967 introduced new
problems and new challenges to the Australians. From January, 1 ATF
operated in engagements outside of Phuoc Tuy. These were again large
scale operations and required some degree of integratio n with
American forces. Similar problems to those experienced by 1 RAR in
1965 were encountered, somewhat lessened in effect by the larger size
of 1 ATF (two battalions were distributed through three bases;
Balmoral, Coogee and Coral) and its increased independence from ll FFV
HQ. The defence of Bien Hoa during the TET offensive in February 1968
was successful in so far as 1 ATF maintained a relatively high enemy
body count and weren't themselves overrun. However, the nature of the
war was such that victories in large scale battle counted for little.
It was hoped that 1 ATF could secure a credible victory in Phuoc Tuy,
one similar in nature to Australia's military experience in Malaya,
where the enemy was totally wiped out, the people supportive of the
Australian presence and the province safe from subversion. an effect,
a lasting and significant impact on the province, culminating in the
battle of Binh Ba in June 1969. 1 ATF returned to Phuoc Tuy, after
several redeployments to Bien Hoa, and engaged in the third phase of
their operations, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy.(42)
This phase, from about mid-1969 to 1971, met with mixed success
also. Although carrying out operations which Australian troops were
more familiar with, the degree of success encountered was somewhat
less than expected. The reasons for this relative failure include not
only the ineptitude of ARVN forces, cooperation with whom was
essential in maintaining an allied presence in any given area, but
also several rather glaring deficiencies in Australian planning. An
ambitious project by Vincent in 1867 to cr eate a minefield barrier
from Dat Do to Phuoc Hai, described by Westmoreland as "imaginative",
had resulted in a substantial number of casualties (almost thirty) in
operations in the Long Hai hills in May 1969 and again by 8 RAR in
January 1970.(43) Whil st it may have been the responsibility of ARVN
forces to patrol the minefield, it was apparent that Vincent was
remiss in expecting them to do so. In addition to this, Larsen
identifies one major deficiency in the Australian civil aid program,
claiming t hat lack of coordination with local administration often
resulted in poor planning and inadequate maintenance of completed
projects.(44)
Quite clearly the major reason for the failure of 1 ATF to
complete a total victory in Phuoc Tuy was the lack of cooperation
between ARVN and 1 ATF and the failure of the civil aid program to win
the support of the populace away from the NLF. Australia's attempts to
train and equip RVN local units and their reluctance to allow these
units any significant participation in the pacification program,
coupled with the failure of these local units to perform adequately,
destined Phuoc Tuy to be returned to the influence of the NLF on the
ATF's withdrawal.
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