11 1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province
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This article is from the Vietnam FAQ, by Brian Ross, John R. Tegtmeier, Edwin E. Moise, Frank Vaughan, John Tegtmeier with numerous contributions by others.
11 1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province
In March 1966, the Australian government announced its intention
to create a single and relatively independent Australian Task Force.
This came largely as a result of political pressure on the Australian
government by Washington but was also consistent with the dominant
foreign and defence policy trends within Canberra at the time.
However, there was good reason to create the Task Force from a
military point of view also. Not only would Australians regain some
control over their troops, they would also b e permitted to conduct
operations in a manner consistent with their experiences and
techniques. Consideration was also given to the limited resources
available to the Australian command in Vietnam and the need to pool
these in order to have a more visible effect.
Phuoc Tuy Province was situated in III Corps Tactical Zone and
had a population of 160,000. At the time the Australian Task Force
arrived, it was a relatively wealthy province, agriculturally rich and
had a comparatively prosperous costal economy.(11) It had been a base
for anti-French activities after WWII and was familiar with the Viet
Minh presence that accompanied these activities. Despite having two
large Catholic migrant towns, it was also a popular base for Viet Cong
activities throughout the peri od of Diem's authority.(12) Operational
in Phuoc Tuy were the 274th and 275th NLF Regiments and D445
Provincial Mobile Battalion, a local force with strong links to the
population, an intimate knowledge of the area and assured
supplies.(13) Phuoc Tuy was chosen because there was a reasonable
amount of enemy activity, no risk of border violations in the pursuit
of the enemy and it had excellent air and sea access ensuring adequate
supplies and an assured evacuation route. The terrain was not
dissimilar from that often encountered by Australians in Malaya and
Borneo.(14) In addition to this, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy was
essential to the Republic of Viet Nam because of it's wealth and to
the MACV because of the significance of Vung Tau port and the supply
line (Route 15) to Saigon and Bien Hoa.
The exact placement of the Task Force was to be Nui Dat, a hill
on Route 2, heading north through the centre of the province, and was
an obvious challenge to the NLF and NVA forces in the area. The
Logistics and Supply Group (1 ALSG) was to be situated in Vung Tau
where it had good access to American supply groups and where it was
hoped that it would be somewhat safer from large scale attack.(15)
The Task Force was to be comprised of 2 infantry battalions (5/6
RAR were the first to serve in 1ATF), artillery (including some New
Zealand elements), engineers, signals and administrative support,
under the command of Brigadier O.D.Jackson. 1 ALSG, situated in Vung
Tau, consisted of 176 Air Dispatch Company, 2 Field Ambulance, 33
Dental Unit, 2 Composite Ordnance Depot and the 101 Field Workshop of
Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.(16) Since August
1964, No.35 Transport Squadron R AAF had been situated at Vung Tau and
one year after the arrival of 1 ALSG, (June 1966) No.9 Helicopter
Squadron was also situated in Phuoc Tuy.(17)
1 ATF's objectives in Phuoc Tuy were never very clear. Because it
came under the operational command of US II Field Forces Vietnam (II
FFV) but under the National command of Headquarters Australian Forces
Vietnam, the Commander 1 ATF had to reconcile sometimes inconsistent
objectives. Westmoreland told Jackson to "take over Phuoc Tuy" (18)
this representing the sum of operational commands to 1 ATF whilst from
COMAFV, directions were only a little more specific. The aims of 1 ATF
were defined as the security and domination of 1 ATF's assigned area,
the security of Route 15, the conduct of other operations as required,
conduct operations anywhere in II Corps Tactical Zone and in Bin Thuan
Province, II Corps Tactical Zone, as required and agreed up on by
COMAFV.(19) The actual practicality of these aims was hard to assess
but it seems that this meant 1 ATF was to act in both a pacification
role as well as a large unit to counter main force activity. COIN
operations would require frequent contact and close coordination with
ARVN forces and the civilian administration, yet the advisory
positions in ARVN and the administration were dominated by Americans.
Alternatively, large scale operations against main force units
required more manpower, mobility and fire support and could not
adequately be completed by two battalions, one of which would be
required for base security at all times.(20)
This obscurity when it came to the nature of operations 1 ATF was
to engage in did provide the Commander with some degree of operational
freedom. It was not long before the Australian forces had applied
their own style of operation. The base at Nui Dat, whilst its presence
was readily felt in the area, was not cleared as were American bases
and few ARVN personnel and no indigenous Vietnamese were allowed in to
the base. This meant that troop strength at any one time was hard to
gauge and security was excellent.(21)
It was D Company of 6 RAR that first encountered the enemy in
strength at Long Tan on the 18th August, 1966. In engaging and
severely damaging D445 Regiment, 1 ATF had established a moral and
later physical victory over the NLF in Phuoc Tuy. The TET offe nsive
of February 1968 also contributed to the relative demise of the VC 5th
Division (274 and 275 Regiments) in the region, due to the heavy
casualties they took. In order to combat the decreasing strengths of
the pre-existing NLF forces in the province D440 was created in 1967,
however, this too proved relatively ineffective, not being a local
force so much as comprising large numbers of NVA personnel.(22)
In November 1967, 1 ATF was increased in size by an extra
battalion (including of NZ artillery) and was reinforced by a squadron
of Centurion tanks. This was largely in response to the deteriorating
military situation in Vietnam and the possibility of a TET offensive.
General Vincent(COMAFV, Jan. 67 to Jan. 68.) was enthusiastic to
increase Australian forces either to enable them to take
responsibility for all of Phuoc Tuy or alternatively to allow 1 ATF to
operate more tangibly outside Phuoc Tuy Provinc e.(23) As a result, in
January 1968, 1 ATF was ordered to occupy an area 12 km north of Bien
Hoa airforce base with a view to preventing any expected TET assault.
1 ATF successfully engaged and defeated the enemy in February (as it
did an offensive in Baria at the same time) and returned to Nui Dat.
It was again called on to help defend Bien Hoa in May.(24)
If Vincent was enthusiastic about Australia's role in the war,
then McDonald, his successor, was passionate. McDonald was keen not to
see Australian operations limited to "[saving] the odd house from
being burned to the ground" in Phuoc Tuy. In gaining U S support for
operations against the VC in the Long Hai Hills in March 1968,
McDonald believed the US was attempting to hasten Australia's victory
over the enemy in Phuoc Tuy so as to get 1 ATF operational in areas of
more strategic importance.(25)
By 1969 and the beginning of the US withdrawal from South
Vietnam, II FFV had re-prioritized its aims and instructed the then
COMAEV, General Hay, that 1 ATF should do likewise. First priority was
to be given to pacification, second to upgrading ARVN for ces and
thirdly to military operations. Pacification operations began in May
1969 however, hampered by unenthusiastic ARVN forces, they proceeded
slowly. The success of the ATF in forcing the withdrawal of NLF
mainforce units and the provincial battalions (the remnants of D445
and the newer but understrength D440) was countered by the maintenance
of the VC infrastructure in the villages.(26) Thus, as the Task Force
withdrew in December 1971, the remaining AATTV members presided over
the gradual return of NLF in Phuoc Tuy.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
in Vietnam
As part of the policy of encouraging American involvement in
Vietnam, and as a result of his convincing victory at the polls in
November 1966, Menzies decided to increase Australia's military
commitment to Vietnam to include elements of all three service s. The
commissioning of two Charles F. Adams guided missile destroyers in
1965 and the impending replacement of Canberra bombers by F-111s had
made available to COMAFV additional sources for Australian expansion
in Vietnam.(27)
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