02 The Use of Armoured Vehicles in the Vietnam War: The role of Armour
Description
This article is from the Vietnam FAQ, by Brian Ross, John R. Tegtmeier, Edwin E. Moise, Frank Vaughan, John Tegtmeier with numerous contributions by others.
02 The Use of Armoured Vehicles in the Vietnam War: The role of Armour
Armour has many roles in normal warfare. These range from seizing
ground, shocking the enemy command and control structure,
supporting infantry, destroying enemy AFV's and through to finally
counter-attacking enemy attacks. In counter-insurgency warfare and
in Vietnam in particular it was found that those roles expanded
considerably to include such tasks as convoy protection, asset
protection and other internal security tasks.
It was though, the ability of armoured units to bring to bear
relatively large, massive amounts of fairly discriminatory
firepower that was extremely mobile, was the major reason why all
participants in the war turned to its use. Reading through any
battle history of the war one comes across accounts time and time
again of where armoured units were able to basically decimate their
opponents because of the amount of firepower they were able to
bring to bear quickly against them whilst being protected by their
own armour plating.
The US Army, in particular had a long history in WWII and Korea of
the aggressive use of armour and this carried over to Vietnam where
by its ability to force the pace and outmanoeuvre the enemy units
were of considerable value. However, as Starry points out, whereas
in previous wars armoured units had been used as the forces which
probed and outflanked the enemy, in Vietnam, "armour was used as a
fixing force," essentially engaging the enemy and bringing him to
battle, "while airmobile infantry became the encircling manoeuvre
element."(14)
Whereas the French, in the previous Indochina war, against the
communist Viet Minh had suffered severe casualties within their
armoured units whenever they had been ambushed, the US and allied
forces found that usually, "the armoured force, led by tanks, had
sufficient combat power to withstand the massed ambush until
supporting artillery, air, and infantry could brought in to destroy
the enemy."(15) So throughout the war, engagements for armoured
forces usually took place with the armour forcing or creating the
fight, often through invasion of the enemy's "safe areas" and
infantry being used to reinforce or encircle were typical.
Perhaps the only real success for armour from the outset amongst
the Americans and ARVN was the way in which mounted combat came to
the fore for infantry in the form of the ACAV (Armoured Cavalry
Assault Vehicle). Until Vietnam, the US Army's doctrine had been
that infantry units should dismount before assaulting an enemy
position. However, as the ARVN discovered, this meant that when
facing the massive amounts of firepower that the NLF or VPA could
bring to bear during a firefight, the infantry was exposed to
needless casualties, as well as losing the momentum of the
attack.(16) Indeed it was the ARVN which pioneered the use of
mounted tactics from APC's when they first deployed the M113 in
1962. They were also the first to discover the need for increased
firepower on the vehicle by mounting an extra .30 Cal. MMG beside
the commander, fired by an exposed prone soldier lying on the roof
of the vehicle. Perhaps more importantly, they also discovered the
vulnerability of the exposed track commander when manning the
pintle mounted .50 Cal. HMG during the battle of Ap Bac where 14
out of 17 commanders became casualties.(17)
The US Cavalry units, perhaps smarting under the loss of their
beloved tanks, took to the idea and improved upon it by creating
the ACAV. They added armour around the commander and a gun shield
for the .50 Cal., provided two extra M60 GPMG's each athwart the
roof hatch (protected by shields) and installed an M79 Grenadier
inside the troop compartment, firing through the roof hatch to
provide close support. The result was a vehicle which was able to
go where tanks weren't, by virtue of its lighter weight and ground
pressure, packed considerable firepower and was agile and
reasonably well armoured. The result, when coupled with the
aggressive leadership and tactics of the US Cavalry's commanders
was highly effective by all accounts.
US Army tanks only encountered VPA tanks once during the entire war
and that was at the Ben Het special forces camp in 1969 when VPA
PT76 light tanks, supported by BTR50 APC's attacked the 1st
Battalion, 69th Armor which was helping defend the camp in the
Central Highlands of II Corps, with ARVN infantry. The battle
occurred at night and the training and night-fighting equipment of
the US tanks quickly showed their superiority. Although, because
of the basic uncertainty of ever encountering VPA armour had
resulted in the M48's of the US unit carrying too few HEAT
(High-Explosive Anti-Tank) or AP (Armour- Piercing) rounds to
complete the destruction of the enemy vehicles (they had, in the
closing stages of the battle to resort to the use of HE rounds), it
demonstrated that the M48 in competent hands was very much still a
potent anti-armour weapon.(18)
The Australian experience was similar, although due to the
political constraints of Australia's involvement, the size of the
units involved were usually much smaller. Indeed, the entire
deployment of Australian forces to Vietnam never amounted to much
more than a heavily reinforced infantry Brigade at its height,
while its armour elements never amounted to more than a squadron of
APC's and a squadron of Centurion tanks.
As a consequence, whereas American armoured units often operated
independently of infantry formations, the squadron of tanks and
APC's which were part of the Australian Task Force operated
primarily in close cooperation and support of the infantry force
within the Task Force. In particular, their operations during
1968, in and around the Firebases Coral and Balmoral were notable,
as was the attack on Bin Ba in June 1969. The Australians also
experimented with the concept of mounted cavalry combat towards the
end of the war but it never really gained favour in what was
essentially an infantry dominated army.(19)
The ARVN, on the otherhand, hampered by its lack, until late in the
war, of any MBT's, found its armoured units more often than not
being employed on security duties. An exception to this was the
disastrous Operation Lam Son 719 during which ARVN units, supported
by American forces (primarily Engineers and helicopters) attacked
the VPA enclaves inside Laos near the border with South Vietnam in
an effort to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and decrease
infiltration. During this operation, the ARVN's units equipped with
M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks undertook the tasks normally
allocated to MBT's and performed reasonably well but suffered
losses from enemy infantry AT weapons. When they did encounter
enemy T54's during this operation the M41 proved itself quite able
to deal with the heavier enemy tank. Something which was later
confirmed in the final offensive of 1975 when M41's took on T54's
in the streets of Cholon and Saigon.
Another exception was the Easter Offensive by the VPA in 1972.
Here, the ARVN and VPA armoured forces encountered one another for
the first time at the battle of Dong Ha on 27 March. The ARVN 20th
Tank Regiment had only received their M48's a few months earlier
from US Army stocks (they were, by all accounts rather worn
examples too). The 20th Tank Regiment itself was an unusual
organisation which, because of the experience of Lam Son 719, where
AFV's had proven vulnerable to individual AT weapons, the ARVN
Joint General Staff had decreed that the 20th Tank Regt. was to
have additional infantry assigned to it in the form of a Rifle
Company of tank riders, who's job it was to ride on the outside of
the vehicles and provide protection during battle to the tanks.(20)
The 20th Tank Regt. proved itself up to the task and successfully
defended Dong Ha and destroyed a large number of VPA armoured
vehicles, including T54's, PT76's and BTR50's. However, the Easter
offensive was also notable for the introduction of a fearsome new
weapon by the VPA: the anti-tank missile (in fact the AT-3 Sagger),
some 18 months before their usually credited mass use during the
Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. The 20th Tank Regt. lost
several vehicles to the Saggers, the ARVN tankers seemingly,
"fascinated by the missile's slow and erratic flight"(21) before
they worked out tactics to counter it.
Indeed, the VPA's experience during the war, as already mentioned
was one of learning many of the lessons that the other major
combatants had learnt in previous wars. This meant numerous
mistakes but as armour was not a major combat arm, these mistakes
resulted in only what were in the main temporary setbacks. In
particular there was the Easter Offensive of 1972, where airpower
played a significant role in blunting the VPA's armoured thrusts.
From this was learnt that organic air defences were needed and in
1975, a considerable number of ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 AA tanks and
SA-7 Strela SAM's were provided.
Indeed, when discussing the 1972 offensive, most VPA commentators
(22) mentioned the signification role of US support in limiting the
successes enjoyed by the VPA. With nearly 900 aircraft, including
100 B52's the RVNAF and the USAF, any weaknesses in the VPA's anti-
aircraft defences were reflected in troop and vehicle losses. By
1975, while the RVNAF's strength had increased to over 1600
aircraft of all types, the VPA was able to establish a protective
umbrella over most troop concentrations, greatly reducing the
incidence of AFV casualties from either tactical bombing or close
air support tasks.
While in 1968 and 1969, at the Lang Vei and Ben Het special forces
camps, armour had attacked with little cooperation with the
infantry, by 1972, the VPA was obviously still failing to digest
the lessons needed from those battles and while fielding mixed
armour and infantry columns their experiences in attempting to
capture the provincial capital of An Loc, in the words of Kym
Stacey, "clearly illustrated weaknesses in tactical co-ordination
and co-operation."(23) Indeed the lack of effective artillery
support, combined with an absence of accompanying infantry, meant
armoured vehicles became easy prey to the anti-armour weapons of
the ARVN forces.(24)
In 1972 though, the mid-intensity style of conflict which the VPA
had been called upon to conduct was a new and novel experience for
it. In particular the commanders lacked the background to organise
large-scale, combined arms operations and this deficiency was
definitely reflected in high casualty rates amongst men and
vehicles. That the three fronts on which the VPA forces were
fighting were uncoordinated and failed to support one another aided
their opponents in the ARVN and US forces to contain the VPA
drives. In particular, on the northern front, the VPA drive lost
its initial momentum due to the inability of the logistics system
to maintain supplies to the fighting units.(25) One commentator
described the situation in these terms:
hesitant uncoordinated fumbling with some well-maintained
Soviet vehicles showed once again that successful armour
employment is totally dependent on aggressive spirit and
technical skill on the part of the tank crews.(26)
By 1975 though, most of these problems had been corrected with
all-arms cooperation reaching a new high, with armour, infantry and
artillery working closely together. Indeed Stacey once more makes
the point that the VPA most valuable lesson learnt from the 1972
offensive was that concentration of armour is the major key to its
employment.(27) For the VPA this meant abandoning its previous
"penny-packetism" and deciding on what were to be the most decisive
battles and those which would have the greatest influence on the
prevailing strategic situation and employing armour there, rather
than spreading it broadly across the whole theatre of operations.
The VPA, according to Stacey, identified two main methods of
successfully employing armoured forces - "sudden assault" and "deep
advance".(28) "Sudden assault" implied an overwhelming of enemy
resistance by a quick attack. In this the shock effect created by
the AFV's was utilised to throw the enemy off balance and prevent
him from regaining his composure. This technique was used against
population centres such as Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Hoc Mon and
ultimately Saigon. A successful "sudden assault" opened the way
for an effective "deep advance" or pursuit. The vulnerability of a
withdrawing enemy meant pursuing VPA forces were able to inflict
heavy casualties on ARVN units, as occurred during the retreat from
the Highlands. In addition, the "deep advance" made use of a
tactic referred to as "blooming lotus" by the VPA, in which units
undertaking the breakthrough of the enemy's lines would then spread
out to exploit that breakthrough and hence cause the maximum damage
possible behind the enemy's defences.
In order to maintain the momentum of their advance VPA commanders
used the technique of "leap-frogging" units. When enemy resistance
was encountered the leading units deployed for a quick assault
while following units bypassed the enemy location to continue the
advance. This was the case with the attack on the Thu Duc
Officers' School outside of Saigon. While it was in progress, other
VPA unis pressed on to attack and seize the Saigon Bridge, and
hence opening the way into Saigon itself.(29)
The speed at which the VPA was able to maintain their advance,
combined with a lack of planning and preparation on the part of the
ARVN forces opposing them, denied the latter opportunities to
regroup and consolidation. The ability of the VPA to sustain its
progress came from a well disciplined and well organised logistics
system based upon more than 10,000 vehicles. To fully capitalise
on the opportunities created by successful infantry and armour
attacks, VPA troops needed the ability to move at the same speed as
the leading armoured vehicles. Where previously VPA divisions had
moved entirely on foot, in this offensive the available resources
made it possible to mount them in trucks for rapid redeployment.
The VPA also made greater use of APC's (Armoured Personal Carriers)
for both troop transport and the close accompaniment of tanks
during assaults. By these various methods, the VPA units were able
to cover an average of 50 to 60 kilometres in a 24 hour period.(30)
The general level of competence of VPA armour commanders also
underwent a vast improvement between the 1972 Easter Offensive and
the 1975 Final Offensive. The VPA established within combined arms
groups a command situation where the senior infantry officer was in
charge, except where AFV's were performing the major attack task,
where instead, the senior armour officer was in charge. Training
also stressed that to carry out an effective tactical appreciation
commanders needed to be in a position to observe changes on the
battlefield, while the implementation of any plan required
commanders to have firm control over all the forces under their
command. This is, as pointed out by Stacey, at odds with the
normal beliefs expressed about Communist leadership training which
has often been criticised for stifling individual initiative, which
has often led to commanders being unable to cope with unexpected
situations. Indeed, according to VPA sources quoted by Stacey,
such as Colonel Xuan's article on the 1975 Spring Offensive,(31)
the VPA's method of carrying out command tasks was to encourage
flexibility and creativity in all combat situations. This was to
apply particularly to commanders of "deep advance" columns. The
successful bypassing of ARVN defensive locations to strike at
centres of command and control depended upon the personal
initiative of individual commanders.
What the VPA had learnt, primarily because of their experiences in
1972, according to Stacey, was that if they ignored the basic
considerations of AFV employment, high casualties could result.(32)
When examining the full experience of VPA armoured operations it is
obvious that no new techniques or innovations occur in comparison
with their opponents in the US or allied armies. What is shown
though, is that there are many valuable lessons demonstrating how
armoured vehicles can be best employed in wartime. Lessons which
were ignored initially by the US Army and its allies, much to their
detriment and which the VPA was forced to learn the hard way
through its failures in 1968, 1969 and 1972. What is interesting is
that it took only 8 years approximately from the first appearance
of VPA armour on the battlefield to it becoming their major
war-winning weapon. Few armies have been able to produce the
necessary evolution in command and control to absorb and make use
of the battlefield lessons which they have learnt the hard way, in
that sort of time frame, when making use of a weapon of which they
have little or no experience.
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